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BARBARA HAHN
IT IS A SINGULAR HONOR TO chair a program committee for a scholarly society, especially for a conference as lively and wide-ranging as the annual meeting of the Agricultural History Society. Since 2006 the society's meetings have proven a fertile field for scholars in a wide range of historical subdisciplines. From its traditional roots in economic history and the cultural and sociological study of rural life, agricultural history has blossomed into a domain of study for historians of science and technology, of gender and the family, of social structure, and the new history of capitalism. The 2013 program committee ably negotiated its way to a conference theme and a call for papers on the subject of "Crops and Cultures: Cultivating Commodities and Communities." This topic inspired a plenary session composed of scholars with a wide range of perspectives on that topic. Each participant was asked to pick a crop and use it to address the question: does crop determine culture?
times. Tiago Saraiva represented the history of science and spoke about oranges. He has studied Portuguese cotton in Mozambique, and his current research focuses on autarky (the goal of self-sufficiency that thrived among European nationalists in the mid-twentieth century); he titled his book manuscript "Fascist Pigs." Peter Coclanis chose rice, which has been the subject of his research since his doctoral work on South Carolina. He has since expanded his scope to a global history of rice production and market integration. Paul Rhode, a professor of economics at the University of Michigan and the editor of the Journal of Economic History, occupies the center of his interdisciplinary field. His work (much of it co-authored with Alan L. Olmstead) has done significant damage to both economic and historical determinism. For the plenary, he compared antebellum US cotton with wheat production in order to consider the relationship between crops and cultures systematically. Claire Strom, author of several books and the editor of Agricultural History, chose to speak about cattle. Her essay presented both a global and long-term investigation of human-animal relations. 2 Does crop determine culture? This big, broad, vague question beckoned the speakers down many potential paths. The routes suggested to the panel included land use, farm size, labor sources and organization, finance arrangements, cultivation methods, sales, and eventual markets. These directions allowed the participants to look beyond the narrow definition of "culture" as cultivation techniques. It was not required that each contributor address each of these suggested subjects-no speaker could work through the categories in ten minutes. Instead, the headings were intended to suggest an array of contextual elements-items standing outside the narrow sphere of cultivation methods and yet somehow operating among the technical variables associated with "crops and cultures." Each contributor could choose whatever seemed the most useful way of accessing the issue.
The old critique of "crop determinism" hung over the query. This approach has been so thoroughly repudiated that Rhode demanded aloud, "Why would you even ask such a question?" Yet crop determinism persists when scholars explore relationships between humans and nature. The plant so often seems to dictate the technology used to produce it, and then, from that point, to organize the surrounding culture. Of course, environmental and agricultural historians have learned to avoid the pitfalls of rigid technological determinism, but they still struggle with the complex causes and effects of technological change. If scholars of technology find its causes in its contexts, then why does it so often seem to traditional historians and casual observers that technology creates change in the surrounding world? Whence comes the method, tool, or machine? Then, how does technology begin to shape the world around it-how does it determine cultural, social, political, or economic structures? For historians of technology, determinism remains a live issue. This is the real question behind "does crop determine culture," and it undergirds the entire discipline of history: what causes what? 3 Does a crop determine its culture? How so? Or why not? Each participant chose a different way to consider the question, as intended. As the disciplinary and individual preferences of each speaker emerge, their very different approaches indicate the vitality of using multiple fields to understand agricultural history. As you read these pieces, consider the challenge that lurked behind the query posed to the speakers: What is the relationship between a crop and its surrounding context-the methods used to produce it, the social structures and cultural assumptions that it both shapes and requires? What causes what, as humans use plants and animals for their own purposes?
Oranges as Model Organisms for Historians TIAGO SARAIVA CROPS DO NOT DETERMINE CULTURE. THIS said, to talk about culture and ignore crops is not only to overlook an important part of the history of culture, but also to miss a unique entry into understanding culture as a whole. The question about crops determining culture points to a notion of causality in history akin to the one we tend to identify with the natural sciences. A good scientific explanation allegedly implies universal laws governing the relations between some basic elementary units (particles, molecules, individuals, etc.) . More than discussing the value and soundness of the humanities trying to emulate this model, it is important to stress that the actual practices of natural scientists rarely fit such a simplified image. In particular, such an image doesn't do justice to the importance of model organisms in biology, "living things from the plant, animal, or bacterial kingdom tailored to experimental purposes." Organisms such as the fruit fly, tobacco mosaic virus, and zebra fish are all intensively used in biological laboratories to gain access to general biological principles. These model organisms are of a very different breed than that of the traditional models of the physical sciences (models of the atom, models of the solar system, etc.), and their use may be associated with a "science with-out laws." Building on M. Norton Wise's suggestion of seeing "science as history," this essay assigns crops, in this case oranges, a similar status in history to the one of those model organisms in the life sciences. As the manipulation of the latter "can generate insights into the constitution, functioning, development, or evolution of an entire class of organisms," tinkering with oranges, I argue, is a good point of entry to generic historical questions about forms of social organization, labor relations, imperial ventures, political regimes, and even postcolonial theory. I think of orange stories as not just another addition to a collection of case studies in the history of commodities, but instead prefer to explore their potential to highlight significant dimensions of very general historical questions. Following the trajectories of oranges reveals unexplored global historical relations, in this case between southern California, South Africa, Israel, and Algeria. 4 The point of departure of my orange narratives is an obvious one: southern California in the first decades of the twentieth century. I approach this oft-told story through the lens of the history of science and its typical interest in the actual practices of scientists, in this case the geneticists and phytopathologists of the USDA and University of California (UC). A close look at their experimental systems reveals how science contributed to the particular social forms associated with the orange orchards of the Los Angeles area. The transformation of oranges into a scientific object deserving an entire institution devoted to its study-the UC citrus experiment station, today UC-Riverside-went hand in hand with the growing and sustaining of citrus cooperatives. It is hard to understand the development of such a complex social institution as Sunkist-the citrus growers' exchange that pooled the fruit of some fifteen thousand orchardists-and how bonds between orange growers were formed, without understanding the experimental systems of scientists. G. Harold Powell's research on blue mold fungus, which led to placing gangs of pickers under direct control of the cooperative instead of individual growers, is a case in point. Powell found that the fungus responsible for the decay of fruit in transition to eastern markets developed from bruises caused by the pickers. To keep the high revenues that made Riverside one of the wealthiest communities in the country, growers trusted the co-op with the task of hiring and controlling wage laborers. The co-op presence was reinforced by A. D. Shamel's research on budding and Herbert Webber's work on rootstocks. As science grew, so grew the co-op. 5 Sunkist often appears in the historiography, mostly as an example of standardized mass production and managerial techniques applied to the realm of agriculture production. Also, historians see the gigantic citrus exchange as paradigmatic of many of the problems associated with agribusiness in the United States and of modern agriculture more broadly. However, oranges have seldom been used by contemporary historians to understand the nature of coops. The most renowned citrus scientists in California, namely Powell and Webber, were disciples of Liberty Hyde Bailey, one of the main figures responsible for putting the co-op at the center of agricultural reform in the Progressive movement. Citrus became an exemplary case invoked by all those involved in the attempt to reconcile modern agricultural production with the growth of virtuous communities abiding by a Jeffersonian ethos. Los Angeles citrus orchards seemed to express in material form the promise of science as the main driving force for democracy in a capitalist society. Instead of unstructured groups of individuals competing to increase their own profits, citrus orchards were the locus of allegedly egalitarian communities of well-educated horticulturalists coordinated by scientific standards. 6 In addition to issues of science and democracy in the United States, following oranges around also reveals unexpected entanglements between the Californian experience and other parts of the world. In 1924 the Fruit Growers' Co-operative Exchange of the Union of South Africa invited Webber, the head of the Riverside citrus experiment station, to South Africa. The mouthpiece of South African growers, Citrus Grower, spoke of Webber's presence as a foundational event: "for many a year his visit will serve as an event from which Citrus growers will date other events. . . . For a number of years everything that he told us has been preached, printed and published in America; and to him it was the ABC of Citrus growing. For most of us it was a revelation." The gospel brought by Webber in his exhaustive one-year survey of every citrus orchard of South Africa was the cooperative gospel. All of his technical and scientific advice to South African growers was directed at solidifying the recently formed cooperative movement. In the same piece greeting Webber's presence, the editorialist assured that "co-operation alone saved and made California-the founder and unquestioned leader of citrus as an industry. Cooperation was the secret of success." 7 Webber stressed four main practices: control of prices, careful handling, rootstock selection, and bud selection. Let us look briefly at the last one. The procedure in question was quite straightforward: growers were to create individual performance records for every tree planted in an orchard to differentiate good yielding specimens from so-called drones, which were to be promptly eliminated. After some five years of recordkeeping, the best performers were to be selected as parent trees from which buds were taken, establishing what could be considered a kind of breeding stud. In California, co-op officials were responsible for cutting the budwoods and distributing them at cost to members and nurserymen. Through the multiplication of these buds, the millions of trees found in growers' orchards were no more than clones of those few selected specimens. 8 In his trips around South Africa, Webber crossed paths with General Jan Smuts, the country's dominant political figure since the end of the Boer War. A spirited dialogue was established between Webber and Smuts, and soon after Webber's passage through the Transvaal, Smuts supported the establishment of a horticultural research station at Nelspruit, the heart of the White River citrus production area. To guarantee California's influence on the new institution, its first director was none other than H. Clark Powell, the son of G. Harold Powell, who had earned his credentials as a citrus expert not only through family genealogy but also through his training at the Riverside experiment station. 9 The encounter between Smuts and Webber suggests something else about the international status of the southern Californian experience during the interwar years. Smuts was, after all, more than the father of the South African constitution. He was also the main ideologue of a British Commonwealth seeking to prolong the life of white rule through international cooperation. Smuts should be given full credit for putting flesh to the idealistic proposals of Woodrow Wilson for a new international order based on an association of nations. Communities of educated white orange growers-organized in cooperatives practicing scientific agriculture, relying on "inferior" races for manual labor, and selling their produce in the British market-constituted the perfect embodiment of Smuts's international order. It was to explore the feasibility of such a view that the Empire Marketing Board, the agency formed in 1924 to promote inter-empire trade and to persuade consumers to buy empire, sent the younger Powell on a mission in 1927 throughout the British mandates, dominions, and colonies, including passage to California. 10 Powell's mission was followed with particular interest in Palestine. During the British Mandate years, citrus became the territory's first export, representing 75 percent of the total value of all exported goods by the end of the 1930s. As Nahum Karlinski explored, it was the private sector, led by the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association, not the public Zionist one, that purchased most of the Jewish-owned land in Palestine prior to World War II. Citrus colonies were established on much of that land, forming communities that relied on Jaffa orange exports to Europe. While the British Mandate government funded Powell's passage to Palestine, many other University of California experts were brought to the territory directly by commercial growers whose vision for the future of Jewish settlement was much closer to the one exposed by Smuts than that of the labor Zionist movement. The ordered orange groves of Jewish settlers, cultivated along well-defined geometric lines with enough space for an irrigation infrastructure, as well as the streamlining of picking operations, contrasted with the old dense and irregular orchards managed by Arabs. In other words, the Californian orchard became a space of demarcation in the Palestinian landscape that distinguished Jewish settlers from their Arab counterparts. The proliferation of orange groves that allegedly sustained communities of settlers was in fact a central argument used by the Zionist movement to pressure British imperial authorities to accept increasing contingents of Jews into Palestine.
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Digging into the orange story thus makes it possible to identify an American influence in the forging of the post-World War I order very different from the usual one presented in political history texts. And I would risk that this is valid for any other country with a Mediterranean climate and a strong presence of white settlers. If Californian techniques provided Jewish settlers with tools to differentiate themselves from Arab orange growers, so too did they for the "pieds noirs" in Algeria and Morocco, where French imperial agriculture services promoted the Californian orchard through the propagation of Washington navels and Valencias: the two main varieties identified with California. When the struggle for national independence in Algeria started in the fall of 1954, one of the first bombs exploded in a warehouse of the Mitidja Citrus Co-op Society in Boufarik. If the co-op meant democracy and egalitarianism for its members, it meant something very different for the local Arab and Berber populations. 12 It is significant that Frantz Fanon developed many of his insights about the nature of colonial relations while practicing as a psychiatrist from 1954 to 1957 in Blida, in the Mitidja plain, the main citrus production area of the country. Like many other towns in Algeria, Blida had a European neighborhood lined with orange trees, segregated from the Arab quarters, which were referred to as "nigger town." Fanon's visions of the colonial state making the colonized native into a foreigner with no roots in his own land surely owed much to his experience in Mitidja's citrusscape. Blida could well be the object of Fanon's description in the opening of his most famous essay:
The town of the colon is a gorged, lazy town and its stomach is full of good things on a permanent basis. The town of the colon is a town of whites, of foreigners. The town of the colonized, or at least the native town, the nigger village, the medina or the reservation, is an infamous place, populated by infamous men. There, people are born anywhere, and anyhow. They die anyhow, of anything.
Fanon's hospital grounds, with its pavilions distributed between well-kept gardens and tree-lined avenues, seem to be just another element of the colon town. But inside the hospital walls, Fanon was experimenting with his social therapy, subverting the colonial order around him. For Fanon, the patients that populated the psychiatric wards were the actual embodiment of colonial relations, and he established a direct connection between colonialism and mental disturbance. Perhaps the most revealing element of his therapeutic methods to my argument is the role assigned to gardening in his institutional psychotherapy. For the uprooted colonized patient, tilling the land offered the possibility of getting back to life in society, the final aim of the psychiatrist's practice. In contrast to the orange orchards that produced colonial relations in the Algerian landscape and that rooted the pieds noirs in the Mitidja plain, the modest vegetable garden of Fanon's hospital was intended to remake the social ties among the natives that had been broken by settlers' agriculture. Mental health required an alternative mode of gardening to cultivating oranges for the market. 13 This last reference suggests an alternative orange path, one that connects well-known stories of alternative forms of agricultural production and of social organization, but whose plots rarely transcend the local scale. It is not only the all white Californian co-op that travelled with oranges. Gandhi's Tolstoy farm in the South African Transvaal, the Kibbutzim in Israel, or Cesar Chavez's union in California, all challenge us to use oranges to tell a transnational story of alternative cooperatives with subsistence as their key organizing concept. One essential condition for the success of a model organism in the life sciences is its ability to explore multiple significant biological phenomena. Democracy in the United States, the international order of the interwar period and its relation to the British and French Empires, and the building of alternative communities, constitute an array of historical phenomena powerful enough to grant oranges the status of interesting things to think with for historians.
Do Crops Shape Culture? Contrasting Cotton and Wheat in NineteenthCentury North America PAUL W. RHODE CAN A CROP SHAPE CULTURE? SURELY. Determine culture, to the exclusion of all other forces? Surely not. A crop's production characteristics may shape a region's culture in a number of ways, specifically by influencing its degree of urbanization, its labor system, and gender relations. A region's culture depends on how cosmopolitan the region is, which depends on the number and size of its towns and cities. Its culture depends on whether social relations are hierarchical or egalitarian, which depends on how its labor system operates. At the core level, this depends on whether labor is free or slave. A region's culture also depends on gender and family relationships, which are linked to crop production, to the roles and tasks assigned to women, to men, to youth, and to the mature. The crop I would like to discuss is cotton, and for the sake of concreteness, I will contrast it with wheat. And I will focus on North America. In this region, the wheat versus cotton comparison is bound into the standard dualities of North versus South, free labor versus slave, and machine versus hand production. I will look at the effect of crops on urban formation, slavery, and gender relations and roles.
The classical account argues that cotton discouraged urbanization. Cotton was bulky and of high value. A pound of cotton was worth many times a pound of wheat-both were cash crops, able to withstand high freight costs, both non-perishable. Circa 1850, cotton-lint sold for 11.8 cents per pound and wheat for 1.33 cents per pound. Cotton could bear the cost of being shipped long distances to be spun into yarn. There is no reason to do anything more at the site of cotton cultivation than remove the waste and seeds-pick it, gin it, pack it, cart it to shipping point, and put it on a boat. After the invention of the saw gin, local processing requirements were low and primarily rural. There was no need to build a complex of flour mills or even towers of grain elevators to protect the produce from the elements. Just wrap the cotton in burlap and go. The big city was merely the place to put cotton on a boat, pick up the notes, and spend the earnings. These were entrepôt cities and places of pleasure. They were not primarily places of industry.
14 Cotton was much less dense than wheat. It was worthwhile devoting some effort on farms and plantations, and in cities and ports to compress it, to pack it so that it would take up less space on a wagon or ship. But overall, cotton's bulk worked against urbanization. Cotton paid the freight on the round trip of traveling between the areas of cotton cultivation and textile production. There was much empty space on the return voyage and the back-hauls were sold cheap, which lowered the price of imports and undercut the urban production of local tradables. As a result of these forces, there were few cities in the cotton South. As of 1860, only New Orleans, Memphis, Mobile, Savannah, and Charleston attained populations above twenty thousand. Forty cities elsewhere in the United States had attained that status. The cotton South had fewer urban places where new ideas could breed, germinate, and take root. 15 Why slavery? Why in cotton and not wheat? One argument focuses on the efficiency of the gang labor system, with its regimented labor working from dawn to dusk under supervision. I find this discussion unconvincing because according to most accounts, picking was the binding constraint-more cotton land could be planted than could be picked-and picking was done on an individual rather than a gang basis. Thus slavery was not used in cotton solely or primarily in the pursuit of gang labor efficiencies. There are discussions of the purported economies of scale in cotton production and the lack thereof in wheat. That is, it is often asserted that there were no economies of scale in wheat production in the nineteenth-century United States (although they are accepted for Britain). Also note, economies of scale would in either case actually facilitate the competiveness of large-scale wage-labor operations by allowing their owners to pay workers more than they could earn running their own small farms.
I do think that seasonality is important for culture independently of slavery. Cotton had a long harvest period starting in August and lasting into December and even the new year. The long harvest season was not a technological given. One could harvest all at once by stripping the cotton off the plant, in the boll and out of the boll, using a picket fence if necessary to separate the bolls from the stalks, then let the gin collect what fiber it could from the unopened bolls, leaves, and waste. The desperate farmers on the high plains of Texas did this in the mid-1920s, developing a mechanical stripper long before the introduction of the first effective spindle picker, which could gather open bolls from the still living cotton plants. And there was nothing about stripping cotton that made it technically infeasible fifty or even one hundred years before-if one wanted to live like a Texan. 18 But there was more money in growing good-quality cotton, in letting the top crop come in, and eliminating most of the trash. Instead of being a technological given, then, the long picking season was economically advantageous. And it had cultural effects. It cut into or interrupted the school year and made Christmas, not Thanksgiving, the harvest festival of the South. The plantation books make very clear that Christmas was the big holiday in the slave South. The hogs were slaughtered, the cotton was mostly in, and that which was not could wait. 19 The forces that I think are important and that explain the use of bounded labor are, instead, first, cotton's value. Second, work in cotton productionplanting, chopping, and picking-was routine, not arduous. And it did not require skills acquired over a long period of training or much highly incentivized decision-making. The activity requiring the most care and discretion was the chopping; the task involving the most thought and attention was selecting and keeping seed.
Third, cotton was labor intensive-there was a lot of work to do on a little plot. According to the USDA estimates for 1840, cotton required 135 hours of labor per acre; wheat (pre-mechanical reaper) required 35. So there was four times as much work to do per acre for cotton than for wheat. Am I saying that the higher labor intensity meant the plantation owner had to enslave labor so it would be cheap enough to do all the work? No. What I am saying is there was enough work to do in one place to cover the cost of maintaining an onsite supervisor-an overseer or driver. The early principal-agent problem cited by Brewster-that in, agriculture individual decision-makers are dispersed across a large space (and must be made the residual claimant to have the right incen- 20 Finally, another aspect of cotton production that made it different from wheat-and I think created advantages for coercion-is there was little that had to be done right away. With wheat, if you did not get the harvest in when the grain was ripe and the sun was shining, there was a chance that bad weather would hit and all would be lost. The window was narrow. With cotton, if you did not harvest today, the cotton would still be in the field tomorrow; some would fall on the ground or otherwise be degraded, but more would be open. So it was with planting and chopping. One need not have hyperbolic preferences to hear the siren calls of procrastination. Coercion, being forced to work from dawn until dusk, every day but Sunday, is a solution to these calls. I think this aspect of cotton production both creates advantages for the slave system and has other cultural influences.
Another channel through which the characteristics of crop production influenced culture was through their effect on gender relations and roles. Claudia Goldin and Kenneth Sokoloff have observed that the gender gap between the productivity of young women and young men in northern grain-oriented agriculture was relatively large. The productivity of women was only about onequarter that of men in northern agriculture but was closer-between one-half and three-quarters that of men-in southern agriculture. Goldin and Sokoloff attribute the differences chiefly to the greater relative productivity of women and children in cotton and tobacco than in the small grain crops. Among the consequences was a greater retention of labor within the agricultural sector in the cotton-producing areas and less growth potential for early manufacturing activity. 21 Recently, Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn offer a crosssociety test of Ester Boserup's 1970 hypothesis relating the relative use of hoes and plows in traditional agriculture to the current relative status of women, gender norms, and gender attitudes. They found that women's economic participation in non-household activities is greater in places where hoe cultivation prevailed than where plow cultivation prevailed. Their approach more closely associated hoe culture with gender equality than Boserup originally did. Focusing on Africa and southern and eastern Asia, Boserup had asserted what may be paraphrased as "the veil follows the plow"; that is, the performance of soil preparation activities by men using draft animals was associated with the seclusion of women to a more narrow domestic sphere. Boserup did not assert that gender roles were more equal when women participated in-or more accurately, chiefly performed-the soil preparation work using hand tools. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn go several steps further. 22 While there is an ongoing debate about how sharp the gender division of labor was in the American cotton sector, there is no question that women contributed significantly to production of this cash crop. In our work studying antebellum plantations, Olmstead and I have found that women and children picked a majority of the cotton crop. In our sample during the 1840-1862 period, adult men picked 47 percent of the total; adult women picked 43 percent; and children (age fifteen years and younger) picked the remaining 10 percent. Adult women typically performed more cotton-picking labor-working more days in the operation-than their male counterparts. The difference in daily picking rates of adult men and women was on the order of 7-11 percent when controlling for the days picked. 23 Of course, women could and did work in wheat, especially at the pre-mechanized harvest, in binding, shocking, and, for some, in cradling. But many of the tasks involved in wheat would have been very hard on pregnant and nursing women. By way of contrast, many activities in cotton production have the characteristics that Judith Brown has argued are associated with greater female field work contributions: "the participant is not obliged to be far from home; the tasks are relatively monotonous and do not require rapt concentration; and the work is not dangerous, can be performed in spite of interruptions, and is easily resumed once interrupted." That is, they are more compatible with simultaneous childcare responsibilities. 24 And it is important to recall that half of white women born in the early nineteenth century (and likely well more than half of black women) gave birth to seven or more children in their lifetimes. This meant that a large fraction of a woman's adult life would have been spent pregnant or nursing. Pregnant women could and did pick cotton, almost up to the day of giving birth. Their picking rates were lower but not by much. They typically returned to the field one month after giving birth, even when nursing. The picking rates were down, but again, not by that much. And therein lies the rub, why crops can shape culture without determining culture. Cotton could be grown in ways allowing slave women (and men) time to care for their children. But often at the masters' command, they did not. An older woman other than the mother often provided childcare during the workday. 25 Crops open possibilities, humans choose among them. Crops shape culture through many channels, most notably through influencing urbanization, labor systems, and gender relations and roles. The cotton versus wheat dichotomy figures prominently in the literature on North American agricultural history. Examining the production relationships for other crops and looking outside the North American context would clearly add valuable perspective on how crop shapes culture.
Do Crops Determine Culture? Rice as a Case PETER A. COCLANIS MALCOLM GLADWELL HAS HIS FANS, I readily admit, but he is an acquired taste that over the years I have resisted acquiring. Playing off of a famous description of fabled Ohio State football coach Woody Hayes's conservative offense, Gladwell's work always seems to me like "three anecdotes and a cloud of dust," leaving me and many others, I suspect, in a fourth and one situation, thereby forced to punt. Chapter Eight of Gladwell's 2008 blockbuster Outliers, which focuses on the relationship between rice production and cultural production more generally, offers a case in point. 26 In this chapter, Gladwell contends that the rigors of paddy rice production-months of minutely calibrated, stoop-backed labor in steaming fieldsgo a long way in explaining why the Chinese as well as the Japanese, Koreans, Hong Kongers, and Singaporeans do so well today in mathematics, another rigorous "field." The author summarized his claims in the following way in an interview on NPR: "Rice farming lays out a cultural pattern that works beautifully when it comes to math. . . . It is also the most cognitively demanding form of agriculture. . . . There is a direct correlation between effort and reward."
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In other words, it was paddy rice production-labor-intensive and cognitively demanding-that culturally preconditioned the Chinese and other East Asians to succeed in math. The author's logical train never leaves the station, weighted down, as it is, with what statisticians call "semi-attached figures." Gladwell's curious causal sequence goes as follows. Rice cultivation in Asia historically has been labor-intensive. Some studies have shown some Asians to be "task-persistent," that is to say, to work assiduously on problems at hand. Students in some Asian countries (and Asian Americans from certain ethnic backgrounds) score well on math tests. Connecting the causal dots: rice cultivation takes a lot of hard work. Math takes hard work. Asians grow a lot of rice. Asians do well in math. Therefore, they do well in math because of the fact that they historically grew paddy rice.
There are a number of problems with Gladwell's claims, many of them germane to our theme. We can start by pointing out that for hundreds, and in some cases thousands of years, paddy rice has also been produced in labor-intensive settings in other parts of Asia-on Java, in Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines, for example. I am not aware of any studies claiming that the inhabitants of these areas are exceptional in math. And what about peoples in other parts of the world long associated with the production of paddy rice-peoples in the upper Po Valley of Italy, in the Valencia region of Spain, or in the Senegambian region of West Africa, for example? I have seen no evidence that they excel in math. And striking closer to the heart of Gladwell's case, that is to say, China itself: do populations in rice-growing southern China do better in math than populations in wheat/millet/sorghum-producing northern China? Gladwell buries this thorny issue in a footnote. 28 The above discussion prefigures my overall argument. I make two major points here. First, rice production can, and historically has, affected and influenced-indeed, in certain cases even inflected-cultures in powerful ways, but has never determined them. Second, rice can be and historically has been produced in many different ways. The assumptions of some major social theorists and historians notwithstanding, neither nature nor so-called technical requirements determine rice-cropping regimes, and there has never been and there is not today a fixed-proportions production function for rice.
Let me take up the point about rice's formative power first. Most readers of Agricultural History are familiar with the hoary concepts "Asiatic mode of production," "oriental despotism," "hydraulic empires," and "hydraulic civilizations": related concepts that trace back their roots to Marx and Engels, Weber, and later to the anthropologist Julian H. Stewart and especially to the German historian/Sinologist Karl Wittfogel. These concepts differ a bit, but they all draw connections between cultures characterized by agricultural systems dependent upon centralized, large-scale, government-run irrigation and flood-control systems, on the one hand, and despotic forms of government on the other. According to this argument, the state's monopoly over water infrastructure was said to be vital, even indispensable for agricultural production. Such a monopoly allowed state actors to establish and sustain in some areas extremely authoritarian and predatory governing regimes, which allegedly ran roughshod over cowed populations of farmers rendered supine because of their water needs. Most, but not all of these regimes, are said to have been located somewhere in Asia, and almost all of those in Asia focused on the production of rice. 29 Despite the fact that most specialists in history, anthropology, political science, sociology, and economics have poked gaping empirical holes in this concept for well over fifty years, some highly regarded scholars-Donald Worster among them-still give it some credence and find it useful at least in part. Although I am more sympathetic to the critics of the concept than its champions, I am willing to concede that at certain times and in certain places rice has been produced in ways that were associated, and perhaps linked causally, with coercive power relationships. I am willing to concede as well that access to, if not control of water and/or waterworks by the state-or, alternatively, by narrow groups of elites-sometimes played roles in facilitating and fostering such coercion. After all, my earliest work on rice was on production in the South Carolina low country, the wealthiest plantation district in early North America, and where rice and power were closely linked. Even here, many small-scale rice growers were able to carry on, and fewer than 40 percent of the farms in the low country of South Carolina and Georgia grew any rice at all in 1859. Despite the links at times between rice and power asymmetries, I am not willing to concede that there is anything intrinsic to rice that rendered politicaleconomic outcomes predetermined or foreordained. Indeed, but for the need for some sunlight and some water, there are no "natural" imperatives, and no lockstep relationship, between what the French call riziculture and culture more generally. 30 Notwithstanding the timeless associations between rice and labor-intensive production by peasant cultivators on tiny, irrigated plots of low-lying land, the cereal is grown in a wide array of environments in manifold ways. And this has been true historically. If much of the world's rice production conforms to stereotypical views, considerable production has always resulted from different cropping regimes. Over the millennia a good deal of rice production in Asia, for example, has originated in shifting, non-irrigated ("dry") plots of jungle or hill-country land worked by slash-and-burn agriculturalists rather than by sedentary producers in irrigated paddies. Moreover, many paddies are rain-fed rather than irrigated, and a lot of rice in flood plains and deltas in Asia (and West Africa) is grown in deep water, with the plant often submerged in depths greater than one hundred centimeters for periods lasting from a few days to more than five months. Yields and productivity differ considerably in these different rice ecosystems, as do the cultures of the peoples who inhabit them. While rice production in the Valencia region of Spain even in the midtwentieth century corresponded more or less with the "timeless" rice stereotype, production on the Andalusian plain was very different, with the cereal being cultivated on large, capital-intensive latifundia. Production in the Western Hemisphere's first two centers of rice production-the South Atlantic region of what later became the United States and northeast Brazil-was labor-intensive, but the labor was provided by slaves rather than by peasant cultivators, and in the United States the rice was grown largely for export purposes on large units of land. 31 And, of course, after the so-called rice revolution in the old Southwest in the late nineteenth century (a revolution organized and staffed largely by whites from the Midwest), rice-purportedly the most labor-intensive of crops-was quickly transformed into the most capital-intensive cultivation regime in the United States, if not the world, a regime in which by 1910 one worker with mechanized equipment and a horse or two could cultivate two hundred acres of rice lands. A hundred years later, the descendants of that same worker-supplemented by an airplane to seed, his or her mounted GPS system, and a combine with a thirty-foot header-could work one thousand acres. Indeed, few agricultural landscapes on Earth seem so anomic, lonely, and alienated as that of east central Arkansas, where pumping stations seem to outnumber people (but not mosquitoes) much of the time. 32 One area that does rival that part of Arkansas in this dubious category is the rice zone in New South Wales and in Northern Victoria in Australia, arguably the most efficient producing area in the world. And if we're talking yields per acre rather than total factor productivity, Egypt is similar to New South Wales and Victoria. In Japan, where the cereal is grown very differently-with tender loving care on tiny plots with specially designed "minimachines"-yields are very high, too. Why? Scientific breeding, ingeniously designed machinery, and high-tech practices, to be sure, but also because marginal labor productivity declines very slowly in the case of rice, and yields increase for a long time with greater labor intensity, as Clifford Geertz famously pointed out long ago with reference to rice production on Java's irrigated "sawah" plots. This was the case in pre-modern Japanese riziculture and is true to some extent even in contemporary Japan, where transplanting from nurseries to paddy fields is still done, albeit with mechanical transplanters! And yields in places such as Uruguay and Argentina as well as South Korea and China rival those of Japan, all of which fall a bit below yields in the United States. Tell me, then, do you see all that much in common in agricultural and broader cultural terms between and among all of these different places? 33 And even in the low lands of mainland Southeast Asia, cultivation systems developed quite differently over time-in terms of scale, tenancy patterns, agricultural finance, hydraulic schemes, market orientation, etc.-and retain many differences even today. To be sure, rice, from some perspectives, seems a rather intransigent, even intractable crop, and the biological requirements of the plant itself have led many "rice societies" down broadly similar paths for long periods of time. The hoary adage about the similarities between Charlestonians and the Chinese-they both worship their ancestors and both love rice-comes to mind in this regard. In any case, such paths were never identical and sometimes not even close. And if the scientists at the International Rice Research Institute in Los Baños, the Philippines, are successful in their ongoing project to genetically modify rice from a so-called C3 plant into a C4-the numbers relate to the number of carbon atoms in the initial sugars rice makes-they may bring about further biological, economic, social, and cultural differentiation in rich-producing areas, especially between those in the tropics and those in temperate parts of the world. These are just a few of the complexities involved in studying rice in global terms. 34 Speaking of complexity: we haven't really considered the uses of rice or its markets, topics that add further complications, not to say paradoxes, ironies, and contradictions. Rice and wheat are the world's greatest food staples, with rice far more important to the world's poor. The uses to which the two cereals are put differ significantly, however, as do the degree to which and the way in which the output of each is marketed. The vast majority of the world's rice production is consumed onsite or in local markets, and the world rice market is very thin; generally speaking, only about 5 to 8 percent of total world production is traded internationally, less than half the percentage for wheat and other small grains. The greatest exporting countries are all in Asia except for the United States, which is a leading exporter without being one of the major producers. In 2012-2013, for example, the United States produced about 1.5 percent of the world's rice, while accounting for about 8.5 percent of world exports (placing us fifth among world exporters). Having studied rice for a long time, I have come to realize that very few Americans know we even have a rice industry anymore, which is not surprising given the fact that there are only about six thousand rice farms in the country, almost all of which are concentrated in a handful of states. 35 There is a delightful children's book by Norah Dooley entitled Everybody Cooks Rice that is set in an international neighborhood in an American city where families of various different ethnicities-Puerto Rican, Vietnamese, Indian, Chinese, Haitian, etc.-are depicted as rice lovers who cook and consume rice differently, albeit always very meaningfully. What I have tried to do today is to suggest that many peoples around the world produce rice and impart it with great meaning. But they do not do either in exactly the same way, and there is no technical necessity or imperative mandating that they should.
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Cattle and Cultures
CLAIRE STROM
IN THE 1990S MY SERIOUSLY CARNIVOROUS father gave up eating beef for a while. An English citizen and scientist, the idea of contracting bovine spongiform encephalopathy and his brain assuming the appearance and cognitive capacity of a sponge, terrified him. He was not alone. For a disease that in 2012 had only killed 224 people worldwide, mad cow disease absorbed an enormous amount of scientific, diplomatic, and industrial effort. Cattle were slaughtered, meat imports were banned, and I am still not allowed to give blood in the United States because I have spent more than six consecutive weeks in England. What is interesting about this tempest in a teapot was the uniquely new way that humans started viewing cattle-as a threat. The culture of the late twentieth-century developed world, with so many of the world's diseases eradicated or contained, is terrified of illness and spares little expense in the pursuit of health and longevity. Thus, in this case, the nature of human culture predicated its construction of cattle. 37 This turns Barbara's question on its head. Instead of crop determining culture, I would argue that the nature of human culture at any particular time, has determined how people have constructed their understanding of cattle and how they have interacted with them. People build cultures from the environment that surrounds them. And, as our interaction with the natural world has shifted from awe to arrogance, our relationship to cattle has mutated accordingly. Over time, and very generally, three macrocosmic human cultures have un-derstood cattle differently: first as beings of spiritual significance, then as animals, and, finally, as products.
What is consistent over time, however, is the importance of cattle. Unlike other animals, cattle have received considerable attention from multiple cultures around the globe. Cattle are particularly useful to humans because they can be used for draft power and as a source of protein. Equines, offering similar advantages in horsepower, produce far less milk from their two teats, while goats, although good milkers, are fairly useless as draft animals both because of their small size and their obstreperous temperaments. In addition, cattle are animals of an impressive size (in relation to a person) that exhibit both significant aggressive and maternal behaviors and, coincidently, have about the same gestation period as human females. Consequently, humans have had a long and convoluted cultural relationship with cattle that has followed a fairly consistent trajectory.
In many early cultures, people worshipped cattle. From Egypt to the Eurasian Steppe, Greece to East Africa, India to Mesopotamia, people saw in their bulls and cows the perfect images of virility and fertility, masculine valor and feminine succor. While humans instilled the world around them with mystery and power, cattle were often elevated to god status. The Sumerians worshipped a bull and cow god, the Cretans decorated the palace at Knossos with frescos of aurochs, and Moses chastised the Hebrews for worshiping the golden calf. The Mithraic cult, so popular with the Roman military, involved being cleansed by bull's blood, a ritual successfully co-opted by the competing cult of Christianity in the form of the Eucharist. Varying by degrees, some cultures were so subsumed by the beasts, such as the Nuer of East Africa, that they can be described by a "bovine idiom," whereby all life, self-definition, and worth is bound up in cattle. 38 All of these cultures utilized cattle for food and draft power, although meat was often the least significant output. Milk and its many byproducts were vital protein sources for cultures all over the world, sometimes supplemented with blood. Cattle were rarely slaughtered for their meat, unless very old. Feasting on oxen existed largely in the imaginary world of Homerian banquets and, indeed, Hindus have made the killing and eating of cattle a religious faux pas. 39 But cattle generally had an economic significance beyond their food value. They were signifiers of wealth, the possession of which, in many cultures, was vital to social standing. In East African communities, women brought cattle to their marriages as bridewealth, and men were valued by their cattle ownership. A poor man was a "man without cattle." Cattle-raiding among various groups from the Celts to the Kuria embued the raiders with power and prestige. And being able to muster and sacrifice large numbers of cattle, such as in 370 BCE when Jason of Pherai amassed one thousand head of cattle to celebrate the Pythian Games, represented the ultimate in disposable income. 40 Generally, men cared for the cattle in these early cultures, but women were not neglected in the bovine idiom. In the Illiad Hera is referred to fourteen times as "cow-eyed," and her statue on Samos wears a horned headdress. Among the Mpondo tribe in southern Africa, if a woman is having a difficult delivery, the herd is driven to surround her hut. And most bull gods had their equivalent cow goddess from Sumerian Ninlil to the Babylonian Astarte. 41 With the advent of Christianity much of the world's understanding of religion shifted from natural to human iconography. From the optimism of the Renaissance to the narcissism of the Enlightenment, the focus of human culture became humans, writ large. This reduced the place of animals-and therefore cattle-in the pantheon, replacing them with figures crafted in our own image. Cattle became important not because of what they symbolized, but because of what they were-animals.
After the Black Death, Europe experienced a dearth of people and thus an increase in wages paralleled by a decreased need for arable land and a consequent rise in land available for grazing. This encouraged meat eating. And, starting in the mid-fifteenth century, Europeans' diets changed dramatically, becoming, in a phrase coined by Ferdinand Braudel, a "riot of meat" consumption. This period lasted about one hundred years before the population rebounded and vegetarianism, once again, became the norm for most peasants. Nonetheless, marketing strategies had been developed during the period of high demand, including the long-distance trade of animals. These strategies survived the contraction of demand, ensuring that urban inhabitants throughout Europe maintained a meat-heavy diet. Meat, especially beef, remained an object of desire for most people. This reached its apex in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century as the "land of John Bull and roast beef" sent its fleets around the world in search of, among other things, more grazing lands to produce more cattle. 42 Thus the animals moved from signifiers of wealth and prosperity to actual items of value. Replacing the cattle as icons were the humans who affected their transition from beasts to profits-the men who moved them to market. Over the course of at least five hundred years, men trailed cattle to market from Hungary to Italy, Denmark to the Netherlands, South Wales to England, Argentina to Paraguay, and Texas to Dodge City. These men, known variously as drovers, Treiber, vaqueros, gauchos, and cowboys came to symbolize the cattle industry and the transition of cattle from animals to income. They represented a semi-civilized state, displaying a seemingly innate understanding of the natural world, a pre-eminence over their beasts-both bovine and equine, and a reluctance to succumb to the strictures of society. The bad boys of the West from the fifteenth century on, they raided cattle, killed one another, went on drunken sprees, destroyed property, and were viewed by their societies with a spurious envy. Everyone enjoyed reading about cowboys, but few really wanted to be one or even meet one.
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The society of the cattlemen was strictly gendered. The physical rigors of the business combined with social mores to create a totally masculine space. Men, in the company of horses, dogs, and other men, tended to and moved cattle around the various continents. Women existed only on the peripheries. They appear in trailing narratives as iconic figures such as good-hearted prostitutes or English innkeepers, providing the cowman with a brief moment of civilized interaction before returning to the wilds. In other cultures, such as that of the gaucho, women achieved a more permanent status as wives and producers, weaving cloth, growing produce, and even making cigars, but they remained excluded from the world of men and cattle. So, as culture in general became more human-focused and arguably more patriarchal, the image that represented human-cattle interactions was no longer of an immortal deity but a mortal man. 44 The final, most recent, shift in the human relationship to cattle happened in the twentieth century and is not globally complete. In much of the world, technology competes with humans as a cultural driver. With technocracies dominating much of the world, the icon has become the product. The bovine gods and the cowboys are gone, replaced by the hamburger. Indeed, many children in the western world do not even associate the food with the beast. This seems only reasonable since producers' aim is to minimize the animalness of animals. They are fattened on feedlots, pumped full of antibiotics and steroids, and fed roughage ranging from cardboard and chicken manure to plastic pellets. 45 As the animal has become invisible, the product has blossomed. In 2011 the population of the United States consumed over twenty-five billion pounds of beef, supporting a beef industry worth seventy-nine billion dollars. Over the last sixty years, global consumption of meat has risen drastically, as other nations have aspired to first world status. People have become pickier about the cuts of beef they consume. However, markets for other parts of the animal remain strong. Beef byproducts are used in obvious ways as leather, pet food, and gelatin, but they also appear in products ranging from fire-fighting foams to surgical sutures, from fabric softeners to outboard motor oil.
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As the cattle industry has grown so has both its economic and environmental impact. Cattle, as we all know, are an inefficient use of the world's nutrients. They contribute significantly to greenhouse gases through belching and flatulence, while burning fuel to produce feed and process meat and milk contributes still more. In many ways our world, and our future, are more affected by our cattle complex than the world of the ancient Greeks or even that of the British colonizers, but the evidence is kept from view. The modern cattle culture is not gendered, indeed, it is profoundly non-human. In many ways, its existence is as non-corporeal as that of Zeus or the Holy Ghost. It is a technological/scientific cash cow, fueled by flesh but paying dividends in stocks and bonds. SHATTERING HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO NUMEROUS SUBDISCIPLINES has resulted in abundance. These essays point to so many ways to consider big questions about how societies worked, organized production, related to their environment. Each speaker used different intellectual tools, and the range of devices they employed raised the question beyond agriculture to the larger question of causation, which forms the philosophical basis of the discipline. 48 A twenty-first century historian of science, Saraiva is more interested in the actual practices of scientists than in the theories and proofs they constructed. He borrows the concept of "model organisms" from the life sciences and takes the orange as a "thing to think with"-a lens for viewing "forms of social organization, labor relations, imperial ventures, political regimes, and even postcolonial theory." When the agricultural scientists of California transferred the technology of orange cultivation to South Africa, they moved not only rootstocks and cultivation methods but also the Sunkist model for controlling laborers and harvesting the crop. White settlers used native workers they considered inferior and sold their produce under the imperial protections of the British market. Likewise, in Palestine, techniques borrowed from California allowed Jewish settlers to differentiate themselves from the traditional Arab citrus culture of the region, while French colonists in Algiers and Morocco likewise used Californian cultivation methods, along with Californian varietals, to displace indigenous plants and people. Saraiva traces the movement of oranges around the world as they carried with them a distinctive culture (the Sunkist cooperative). Yet different places experienced distinct outcomes: Jeffersonian democracy in California, race-based empires for Britain and France, the alternative communities of kibbutzim, and an example of imperialism's social corruptions for social theorists. Even when a specific culture accompanied oranges around the world, the two together did not determine the way of life that emerged.
Rhode deliberately avoids determinism by comparing cotton to wheat, a proxy for other oppositional categories in US history: free and slave, North and South, mechanization via reapers versus hand labor with hoes. He defines culture into three specific elements: urbanization and cosmopolitanism, labor arrangements, and family and gender relations. This three-part definition allows him to perform the positivist analysis economic historians appreciate. Cotton's bulk and relative value worked against urbanization because so little was done to the crop where it grew. For labor arrangements, Rhode picks apart the available explanations of slavery in cotton and free labor in wheat. He concludes that coercion worked better in cotton because procrastination was so possible-unlike wheat, with its narrow window for harvesting. For family, gender, and reproduction, crops and their methods did dictate culture. Tasks difficult for pregnant and nursing women abounded in wheat but less in cotton. Women worked cotton until confinement and returned to the fields a month thereafter, with little impact on their productivity.
Yet the techniques of agricultural production in each of these crops did not dictate whether or not women spent most of their lives pregnant. That cultural characteristic stands outside the closed world (of crop production, in this case) that systematic investigation requires. If Rhode avoids determinism, it is because he knows that many human choices have already occurred by the time that "crop" refers to a commodity that people value rather than the plant itself. If a crop were simply a plant, its only requirement would be to grow and reproduce itself. Human actions would develop only to facilitate those needs. The grower wants cotton's fiber, however. If the market wanted a tea made from the plant's sticks and stems, the technical methods and the plant's requirements would be very different. As Rhode declares, the method of cultivation is "not a technological given."
Standing even further away from determinism is Coclanis's investigation of rice. Riffing off of Gladwell's "Rice Paddies and Math Tests," which links paddy rice cultivation and East Asians' perceived mathematical and computational skills, Coclanis attacks the idea from its watery root to its droopy seedhead. He admits that cultivating rice in water-filled paddies has influenced, "even inflected," the cultures that rely on this crop, but argues that the crop has never determined the culture. Besides, there are many ways to grow rice. Coclanis reminds us that even the technology of crop production-the narrowest definition of culture possible-has developed in different ways in different places, even in the production of the same plant for the same purposes. Along the way, he finds space to demolish old notions of Asiatic modes of production and oriental despotism, which rely on a crop's technical requirements being suited to specific cultural tendencies. As historians of technology know, there is never one "best way" to do a task. The method that prevails depends on a host of factors outside the plant's processes, and they determine very little in human activity. 49 Strom, too, turns crop determinism on its head, arguing that changing cultures shape production choices, not the reverse. Her global history identifies three types of livestock cultures, classified by human perspectives on cattle "from awe to arrogance." Even in societies that rarely slaughtered them, however, cattle signified wealth: a significant capital accumulation and an investment that continued to pay dividends, in the form of milk, for years to come. Strom identifies Christianity as a force fomenting new attitudes to nature. When sacred iconography abandoned animal imagery, spiritual institutions elevated humans above their context. Historians of technology, of course, have long ascribed to Christianity at least some portion of European economic expansion. Since Lynn White's work on medieval Europe, historians of technology have realized that something changed in that time and place. New attitudes toward nature contributed to making both imperialism and industrialization work. Strom globalizes this insight and finds fresh pasture in human-cattle relations. 50 Does crop determine culture? The question was posed in order to interrogate the space between crop and culture, in which technology, social structure, market relationships, and cultural phenomena all emerge and interact. Tech-nology, however, already includes all of those things. It is not something "out there" but a human activity that at one and the same time shapes and reflects the world around it: economic relationships of supply and demand, bulk and value, frantic or long-span harvest seasons; social structures including gender relations and marketing boards, institutions for hiring or acquiring laborers, structures including race and empire. Context also contains culture-math skills and their association with particular groups of people, work thought suitable for women, the status of animals, images of sacred cows. The history of agriculture is fundamentally and always the history of technology, since agriculture is a technology-a purposeful human manipulation of the physical world by means of devices, machines, or tools. 51 We are all writing the history of technology, whether we know it or notwhether our training has given us the means to avoid deterministic thinking, whether the first cause we identify in analyzing agriculture is the crop or its cultivation method. The relationship between crop and culture, between human purposes and how they are achieved, between technology and its context, is so complex that cause and effect does not quite cover it. If crop shapes the technology used to produce it, then what tells humans what crop they want to extract from the plant? The causative chain is long and tangled. Does crop determine culture? None of these scholars said yes. How would you answer?
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